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The purpose of this article is to critically review the provision of section 48 (2) (d) of the 
Zimbabwean Constitution from a gendered perspective. Section 48 (2) (d) of the 
Constitution would seem to have abolished death penalty for women but retained the same 
for men. Given Zimbabwe’s commitment to gender equality and respect for human dignity, 
this article argues that the disparity in the treatment of women and men under this section is 
not only inconsistent with the notion of gender equality and substantive equality, but also fails 
to comply with the rules of justifying the adoption of remedial measures. It is recommended 
that a better approach by the Constitution would be to abolish death penalty in its totality 
for both men and women. 
 
1 .  Introduction  
The Zimbabwean Constitution of 2013 has been applauded for some of its important 
provisions including for the first time, the inclusion of socioeconomic rights as justiciable rights. 
By explicitly recognizing socioeconomic rights as justiciable rights, Zimbabwe has joined the other 
countries in Africa such as South Africa and Kenya that have accorded these sets of rights equal 
status with civil and political rights as enforceable rights in their constitutions. The Constitution 
explicitly recognizes rights relating to housing, health, and education. 
 
In addition, the 2013 Constitution of Zimbabwe has been commended for its gender-
sensitive approach and commitments to gender equality. In this regard, the Constitution differs 
from the former Constitution by jettisoning the ‘claw back’ provision, which made the provisions of 
gender equality subject to customary law and practice. Section 23 of the previous Constitution 
provided that the recognition of gender equality will only apply, subject to existing customary law 
and practice. In interpreting this provision, the Zimbabwean Supreme Court had ruled in 
Magaya v. Magaya1 that section 23 of the Constitution will not apply to customary personal law 
such as inheritance. In that case, the bone of contention was whether a daughter of a deceased 
could inherit from his estate under customary law. The Supreme Court had rigidly interpreted 
section 23 of the then Constitution by holding that the primogeniture customary law of 
inheritance was neither discriminatory nor unconstitutional. The coming into force of this 
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progressive Constitution signals a new dawn for constitutionalism and advancement of human rights 
in Zimbabwe. 
 
Despite this significant development, this article seeks to critically review the provision of section 48 
(2) (d) of the Constitution from a gendered perspective. Section 48 (2) (d) of the Constitution 
would seem to have abolished death penalty for women but retained same for men. Given 
Zimbabwe’s commitment to gender equality and respect for human dignity, this article argues that 
the disparity in the treatment of women and men under this section is not only inconsistent with 
the notion of gender equality and substantive equality, but also fails to comply with the rules of 
justifying the adoption of remedial measures. It is recommended that a better approach by the 
Constitution would be to abolish death penalty in its entirety for both men and women. 
 
2 . Clarifying the meaning of gender equality 
The term gender is often referred to as social construction of roles for men and women. Human 
beings are born male or female but the society tends to assign different roles to these sexes. 
Hence, men are assumed to be strong, virile, powerful, aggressive and bread winners. On the 
other hand, women are often perceived as weak, gentle, submissive, docile and home makers. The 
gendered-assigned roles are often rooted in cultural and sociological beliefs of the people. In most 
cases, gendered construction of men and women tend to evoke stereotypical beliefs and often lead 
to human rights violations or abuse. For instance, the fact that men are usually believed to be 
bread-winners has sometimes led to wage differences between men and women, with the latter 
earning lower than the former for the same job. 
 
Also, gender stereotypes have led to the erroneous belief that women are meant to be seen and 
not heard. Furthermore, it has led to the situation where women are regarded as child-bearers 
and home keepers.2 This has deepened discriminatory practices between men and women and 
further perpetuated the low status of women in many African societies. In an attempt to 
address this challenge, the international community has adopted women-centred human 
rights instruments grounded in the respect for human rights of all individuals regardless of 
gender or sex. The foremost women’s rights instrument, the Convention on Elimination of All 
forms of Discrimination (CEDAW) against Women broadly defines discrimination to 
include: 
 
[A]ny distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex which has the effect or 
purpose of impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by women, 
irrespective of their marital status, on a basis of equality of men and women, of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural, civil or any other field.3  
 
It further recommends the need for affirmative action in order to address the historical 
disadvantages women have encountered across the world. 
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At the African regional level, the African Union adopted the Protocol to the African Charter on the 
Rights of Women in 2003.4 The Protocol has been regarded as one of the most radical human 
rights instruments to advance the human rights of women.5 The Protocol contains progressive 
provisions among others, addressing gender inequality and the advancement of women\s sexual and 
reproductive health and rights. It requires African states to remove practices that discriminate 
against women and urges states parties to take all appropriate steps to eliminate social and cultural 
patterns and practices that are discriminatory against women.6 It equally calls for remedial 
measures to address past injustices to women. 
 
In addition to these two human rights instruments, the notion of equality and non- 
discrimination are recognized in virtually all human rights instruments including the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,7 the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights8 and the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights.9 The government of Zimbabwe has ratified virtually all these instruments. It should be 
noted that the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights has elaborated on the 
provisions of Articles 2 and 3 of the African Charter dealing with non-discrimination and 
equality before the law. In Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights and the Institute for Human 
Rights and Development (on behalf of Andrew Barclay Meldrum) v. Republic of Zimbabwe the 
Commission noted as follows10: 
 
The most fundamental meaning of equality before the law under Article 3(1) of the Charter is 
the right by all to equal treatment under similar conditions. The right to equality before the law 
means that individuals legally within the jurisdiction of a State should expect to be treated fairly 
and justly within the legal system and be assured of equal treatment before the law and equal 
enjoyment of the rights available to all other citizens .... The principle that all persons are equal 
before the law means that existing laws must be applied in the same manner to those subject to 
them. 
 
From this decision of the Commission, it is clear that all individuals deserve to be treated 
equally and fairly irrespective of their sex, gender or race, religious, or political inclinations. 
 
Furthermore, the Human Rights Committee (HRC) in its General Comment 18 on Non-
discrimination has noted that ‘Non-discrimination, together with equality before the law and 
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5 See e.g. E Durojaye and N Murungi ‘The African Women’s Protocol and Sexual Rights’ [2014] The International Journal of Human 
Rights 18, 881–97; see also F Banda ‘Blazing a Trail: The African Protocol on Women’s Rights comes into Force [2006] Journal of 
African Law 50, 72–84. 
6 See Art. 2 of the African Women’s Protocol, which draws its inspiration from Art. 2 of CEDAW. 
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equal protection of the law without any discrimination, constitute a basic and general principle 
relating to the protection of human rights’.11 It further emphasizes the non-derogatory nature of this 
right by stating as follows: 
 
[T]he principle of non-discrimination is so basic that article 3 obligates each State party to 
ensure the equal right of men and women to the enjoyment of the rights set forth in the Covenant. 
While article 4, paragraph 1, allows States parties to take measures derogating from certain 
obligations under the Covenant in time of public emergency, the same article requires, inter alia, 
that those measures should not involve discrimination solely on the ground of race, colour, sex, 
language, religion or social.12  
 
The Committee reasons that the principle of non-discrimination does not mean equal treatment 
in all situations. It recognizes that in some situations different treatments may apply. It gave 
instances when such different treatment may not amount to a violation of the principle of non-
discrimination. In the Committee’s view, prohibition of death sentence for children or pregnant 
women may be justifiable and may not constitute a violation of the right to equality.13 Limiting the 
prohibition of death sentence to these categories of people is an implicit recognition on the part of 
the Committee of the sensitive nature of such exceptions. 
 
The Committee further reasons that while it may be necessary sometimes to apply affirmative 
action with a view to correcting past injustices or disadvantages experienced by certain categories of 
people, such an approach will only be justifiable when it ‘is needed to correct discrimination in 
fact’. According to the HRC, ‘when legislation is adopted by a State party, it must comply with 
the requirement of article 26 that its content should not be discriminatory’.14 In one of its 
decisions in Nahlik v. Austria,15 the Committee explains that Articles 2 and 26 of the ICCPR 
obligate states to ensure that all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction are 
free from discriminatory practices, whether perpetuated in private or public sphere. 
 
At the national level, South African Courts have developed a rich jurisprudence on equality in 
general and gender equality in particular. Given the similarities in the legal systems of the two 
countries, there is a lot Zimbabwe can learn from the South African experience. For instance, in 
Minister of Home Affairs v Fourie and another16 Sach J adopts a substantive notion of equality as 
follows: 
 
Equality means equal concern and respect across difference. It does not presuppose the 
elimination or suppression of difference. Respect for human rights requires the Affirmation of 
self, not the denial of self. Equality therefore does not imply a levelling or homogenisation of 
behaviour or extolling one form as supreme, and another as inferior, but an acknowledgement 
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and acceptance of difference. At the very least, it affirms that difference should not be the basis for 
exclusion, marginalisation and stigma. 
 
In the Bhe case,17 the Constitutional Court struck down the primogeniture cultural practice 
that denies female children the rights of inheritance from their late father. The Court unequivocally 
condemned the cultural practice as discriminatory and unconstitutional. In arriving at its decision, 
the Court noted as follows: 
 
The exclusion of women from inheritance on the grounds of gender is a clear violation of section 
9 (3) of the Constitution …. The principle of primogeniture also violates the right of women to 
human dignity as guaranteed in section 10 of the Constitution as, in one sense, it implies that 
women are not fit or competent to own and administer property.18  
 
From the foregoing, a blanket prohibition of death sentence for only women and not men would 
seem inconsistent with the notion of non-discrimination under international law and the 
clarification provided by the HRC and other relevant bodies. It suggests that more value should be 
attached to the lives of women compared to men. This may not likely lead to equality of purpose 
but will rather undermine the principle of equality and non-discrimination. 
 
It should be noted that a commitment to gender equality should aim at eradicating all forms of 
unfair discriminations against men or women. It is aimed at ensuring that no human being 
should suffer any disadvantage as a result off his or her gender. Also it is intended to promote 
equal treatment of all individuals taking into cognisance their socioeconomic differences. In 
essence, gender equality does not aim at making women behave like men or vice-versa but rather to 
ensure that men and women are treated with utmost respect and dignity irrespective of their gender 
or sex. 
 
However, it should be borne in mind that not all discriminations are inconsistent with respect 
for human rights. In other words, in some cases it may be justifiable to apply measures that 
seem to favour certain categories of people or gender than the other. This is often referred to as 
affirmative action. The question remains what are the limits or scope of affirmative action? Put in 
another way, when will affirmative action lead to a violation of the right to equality and non-
discrimination? 
 
The CEDAW Committee in its General Recommendation 25 has provided some guidance in this 
respect. According to the Committee, states are to adopt affirmative action in order to eliminate 
direct or indirect forms of discrimination against women in their laws and to improve the de facto 
position of women through concrete policies and programmes.19 Moreover, states should 
address prevailing gender relations and the persistence of gender-based stereotypes that affe ct 
women through law, legal structures and institutions. The Committee further recognizes that 
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as structures and institutions. The Committee further recognizes that as steps are taken to 
eliminate discrimination against women, it is important to bear in mind that women’s needs 
may change or disappear or become the needs of both women and men. Therefore, it is 
necessary to continue to monitor affirmative measures in order to avoid the perpetuation of 
non-identical treatment that may no longer be warranted.20  
 
In recognition of the need to address persistent inequalities among diff rent groups in 
society through affirmative action, the South African Court in Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v. 
The Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism21 has noted as follows: 
 
In this fundamental way, our Constitution differs from other constitutions which assume that all 
are equal and in so doing simply entrench existing inequalities. Our Constitution recognises that 
decades of systematic racial discrimination entrenched by the apartheid legal order cannot be 
eliminated without positive action being taken to achieve that result. We are required to do more 
than that. The effects of discrimination may continue indefinitely unless there is a commitment to 
end it.22  
 
3 . Examining section 48 of the Zimbabwean constitution  
Arising from the discussion above, this section of the article critically analyses section 48 of the 
Constitution with a gendered lens, to determine whether it is consistent with Zimbabwe’s 
obligations under international law to eliminate gender inequality. 
 
For the avoidance of any doubt and for clarity sake, it is apposite to reproduce the provision of 
section 48 of the Zimbabwean Constitution of 2013 here. Section 48 titled ‘the right to life’ 
provides as follows: 
 
1. Every person has the right to life. 
2. A law may permit the death penalty to be imposed only on a person convicted of murder 
committed in aggravating circumstances, and. 
 
a. the law must permit the court a discretion whether or not to impose the penalty; 
b. the penalty may be carried out only in accordance with a final judgment of a competent 
court; 
c. the penalty must not be imposed on a person— 
 
i. who was less than twenty-one years old when the offence was committed; or 
ii. who is more than seventy years old; 
 
d. the penalty must not be imposed or carried out on a woman; and 
e. the person sentenced must have a right to seek pardon or commutation of the penalty 
from the President. 
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The part of this section, which is subject to scrutiny or debate, is paragraph (d) of subsection 2. It 
might appear that the intention of the drafters of this provision was to exclude certain classes of 
people from the hangman. The implication of this is that where both a man and a woman have been 
found guilty of an offence that warrants the imposition of death sentence, only the man would face 
the death sentence, while the woman would be excused. This defies logic, given the blanket nature 
of the exclusion. It applies to all women regardless of age, marital status, criminal record or 
propensity. In order to understand the implications of this provision better it is necessary to examine 
the circumstance under which death penalty may be imposed under the Zimbabwean legal system. 
 
Under the Zimbabwean legal system some of the offences punishable by death sentence include 
murder, offences related to acts of terrorism and treason: 
 
1. Murder—This is the intentional taking of life. According to section 47 of the Criminal Code 
any person who causes the death of another, or intends to kill another or embarks on an act 
capable of causing the death of another shall be guilty of murder and if found guilty will be liable 
to be sentenced to death.23  
2. Offences relating to Terrorism Resulting in Death—the law also stipulate the imposition of 
death sentence for offences relating to terrorism, especially when such acts result in death. Thus, the 
following terrorism-related crimes 
are punishable by death if they result in death: causing or furthering an insurrection in Zimbabwe; 
causing forcible resistance to the Government, defense forces, or law enforcement agencies; or 
procuring by force the alteration of any Government law or policy. It should be noted that the 
imposition of 
the death sentence will only arise for these offences if they are accompanied by the use or threatened 
use of weapons with the knowledge that there is a risk of killing or injuring another person; 
damaging or destroying property; inflicting substantial financial loss on another person; obstructing 
the movement of air, land, or water traffic; or disrupting an essential service.24  
3. Treason—Treason is another offence that is punishable by death.25 Moreover, some treason-
related offences if they result in death may carry the death sentence. These include causing or 
furthering an insurrection in Zimbabwe; causing forcible resistance to the Government, defense forces, 
or law enforcement agencies; or procuring by force the alteration of any Government law or policy. 
These crimes are punishable by death only if accompanied by  the use or threatened use of weapons 
with the knowledge that there is a risk of killing or injuring another person; damaging or destroying 
property; inflicting substantial financial loss on another person; obstructing the movement of air, 
land, or water traffic ; or disrupting an essential service.26  
 
Other offences not resulting in death of another but punishable by death penalty include the 
crime of mutiny, and desertion in the face of the enemy.27 Although the death penalty is still 
retained in the country, there is no offence for which a court is mandated to impose the death 
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penalty. In actual sense, the court hardly applies the death penalty. Rather, courts often use the 
concept of ‘extenuating circumstances’ to engage in discretionary sentencing.28 This is similar to a 
mitigating circumstance: ‘a fact associated with the crime which serves in the minds of reasonable 
men to diminish, morally albeit not legally, the degree of the prisoner’s guilt’.29 Also, the court has 
always been enjoined to weigh aggravating and mitigating factors in determining whether to 
impose the death sentence in aggravated murder cases.30  
 
It should be noted that in recent times there have been calls for Zimbabwe to abolish the death 
penalty entirely from its legal system. This call has been echoed by the Justice, Legal and 
Parliamentary Affairs Minister Emmerson Mnangagwa who noted in 2013 that the government is 
seriously considering the abolition of death sentence in the country.31 This call could not have 
come at a better time, given that the international community has intensified the campaign for 
the elimination of death penalty across the world. About 102 countries (more than half) across 
the world have abolished death penalty in law.32 Indeed, Zimbabwe is one of the 34 countries in 
Africa that still retains the death penalty for offenders. During its 56th Ordinary Session in Banjul, 
The Gambia, in April 2015, the African Commission adopted the draft text of an Additional Protocol 
to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Abolition of the Death sentence.33  
 
One of the justifications for the continued retention of the death penalty is that it serves as a 
deterrent for commission of serious crimes. However, a recent publication by the United Nations 
has noted that ‘research has failed to provide scientific proof that executions have a greater 
deterrent effect than life imprisonment. Such proof is unlikely to be forthcoming. The evidence as a 
whole gives no positive support to the deterrent hypothesis’.34 On the contrary countries that 
have abolished the death sentence tend to witness fewer serious crimes. The publication further 
identifies other disadvantages of the death penalty as being too expensive and sometimes used to 
target certain groups in society. 
 
A major argument against the death penalty is premised on the fact that it constitutes cruel, 
inhuman and degrading treatment.35 Moreover, it is deemed to be inconsistent with the 
enjoyment of rights to life and dignity. In abolishing the death penalty in South Africa, the 
Constitutional Court in S v. Makwayane36 noted as follows: 
 
the death sentence destroys life, which is protected without reservation under section 9 of our 
Constitution, it annihilates human dignity which is protected under section 10, elements of 
arbitrariness are present in its enforcement and it is irremediable .... I am satisfied that in the 
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context of our Constitution the death penalty is indeed a cruel, inhuman and degrading 
punishment.37  
 
4 . Section 48( 2 ) ( d) vis -à- vis equality provision in section 56  
As noted above, Zimbabwe is committed to the principles of equality and non-discrimination. This is 
clearly espoused in many provision of the Constitution. For instance, some of the founding 
principles of the Constitution include a commitment to respect of the right to dignity of all 
human beings, equality of all human beings, and gender equality. Moreover, section 56 of the 
Constitution contains elaborate provisions on the right to equality and non-discrimination. It 
provides as follows: 
 
1.All persons are equal before the law and have the right to equal protection and benefit of the law. 
2.Women and men have the right to equal treatment, including the right to equal opportunities in 
political, economic, cultural, and social spheres. 
3.Every person has the right not to be treated in an unfairly discriminatory manner on such grounds 
as their nationality, race, colour, tribe, place of birth, ethnic or social origin, language, class, religious 
belief, political affiliation, opinion, custom, culture, sex, gender, marital status, age, pregnancy, disability, 
or economic or social status, or whether they were born in or out of wedlock. 
4.A person is treated in a discriminatory manner for the purpose of sub-section 
(3) if— 
a. they are subjected directly or indirectly to a condition, restriction or disability to which 
other people are not subjected; or 
b. other people are accorded directly or indirectly a privilege or advantage which they are not 
accorded. 
 
5.Discrimination on any of the grounds listed in sub-section (3) is unfair unless it is established 
that the discrimination is fair, reasonable, and justifiable in a democratic society based on openness, 
justice, human dignity, equality, and freedom. 
6.The State must take reasonable legislative and other measures to promote the achievement of 
equality and to protect or advance people or classes of people who have been disadvantaged by 
unfair discrimination, and— 
 
a. Such  measures must be taken to redress circumstances of genuine need. 
 
This detailed provision prohibits discrimination on various grounds including sex, gender age, and 
marital status. Nonetheless, it recognizes circumstances when discrimination may be justifiable—that 
the discrimination is fair, reasonable, and justifiable in a democratic society based on openness, 
justice, human dignity, equality, and freedom. The provision is grounded in the principle of 
substantive equality in that it urges the state to strive towards addressing past historical 
disadvantages suffered by certain categories of people. Usually a distinction is made between formal 
and substantive equality. The former tends to treat all human beings equally without recognizing their 
differences, while the latter treats individuals equally taking into cognisance the socio-economic 
                                                          




differences. The primary consideration of substantive equality is to  achieve justice and egalitarianism in 
society.38 This provision is a radical departure from the previous constitution in the sense that it has now 
removed the ‘claw-back’ provision to gender equality vis-à-vis the application of customary law.39  
 
It should be noted that section 56 of the Constitution is modelled on section 9 of the South 
African Constitution of 1996. Thus, in determining what will amount to unfair discrimination 
reference will be made to the jurisprudence of the South African Constitutional Court in this 
regard. In Harsken and Lane40 the Constitutional Court made a distinction between 
discrimination and unfair discrimination. According to Goldstone J, discrimination is 
pejoratively referred to as an unequal treatment of people based on attributes and 
characteristics attaching to them. On the other hand, unfair discrimination is described as treating 
persons differently in a way which impairs their fundamental dignity as human beings, who are 
inherently equal in dignity.41 The Court further laid down the factors to consider in determining 
unfairness of discrimination in accordance with section 8 of the Interim Constitution (section 9 of 
the 1996 Constitution). These include the following: 
 
1. The position of the victim in society, 
2. The purpose sought to be achieved by the discrimination, 
3. The extent to which the rights and interest of the victims of discrimination has been affected, 
and 
4. Whether the discrimination has impaired the human dignity of the victim. 
 
What this means is that if the provision of section 48 (2) (d) were to be challenged by a male 
plaintiff as constituting unfair discrimination, he would need to establish the above to succeed. 
Regarding the first condition, can it be said that men have been historically disadvantaged in 
Zimbabwe? The answer will be in the negative as the situation is the contrary. On the second, 
condition, it might be difficult for the government to justify why all categories of women are 
excluded from death sentence and same privilege not extended to men. As noted earlier, if this 
provision was to be limited to pregnant women or women with children only, this may constitute 
a strong justification for its inclusion. However, as it is, excluding all women, married or 
unmarried, with or without children, from death sentence and not according same to men would 
seem problematic and difficult to justify. It should be noted that in the Hugo case42 a 
presidential pardon to convicted women with children less than 12 years was challenged by male 
prisoners on the grounds that it was discriminatory and inconsistent with the equality provision 
of the South African Constitution. In rejecting this argument, the majority of the Constitutional 
Court held that given the peculiar situation of women and the role they play in society, the 
president’s action was not discriminatory. In justifying its position the court noted as follows: 
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For many South African women, the difficulties of being responsible for the social and economic 
burdens of child rearing, in circumstances where they have few skills and scant financial resources are 
immense. The failure by fathers to shoulder their share of the financial and social burden of child 
rearing is a primary cause of this hardship. The result of being responsible for children makes it more 
difficult for women to compete in the labour market and is one of the causes of the deep 
inequalities experienced by women in employment .... It is unlikely that we will achieve a more 
egalitarian society until responsibilities for child rearing are more equally shared.43  
 
Some commentators have argued that the position of the majority in this case is capable of 
perpetuating stereotypes of women as child-bearers and rearers.44  
 
On the third condition, it does seem that this provision tends to attach to more value on women 
than men in society. The subtle message this provision may be sending is that a woman’s life should 
be more cherished than that of a man. The whole essence of substantive equality is not to ‘shift’ 
disadvantage but rather to correct any disadvantage any categories of people may have experienced in 
the past. In the National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v. Minister of Justice and others,45 
the South African Constitutional Court noted that the criminalization of same sex relationship 
between consenting male adults constituted a gross violation of the right to equality and non-
discrimination. This is because on one hand consensual sexual acts between men are penalized 
while on the other hand sexual acts between a man and woman are not punished. 
 
On the last condition, it would seem that the application of this provision will impugn the 
right to dignity of men. It gives an impression that men accused of murder or other capital 
offences are worse criminals than their female counterparts and therefore deserve no ‘mercy’. 
 
It thus seems from the above that there is a conflict between sections 48 and 56 of the Constitution. 
Ordinarily, where a conflict arises between a provision of an act and the Constitution, the latter 
usually takes pre-eminence. However, since there are two conflicting provisions of the Constitution, the 
rule of interpretation will apply. It is trite that where a conflict exists in the provisions of a legislation, 
the latter provision will take pre-eminence In this situation, the provision of section 56 of the 
Constitution will take pre-eminence over section 48 (2) (d). As noted earlier, a more pragmatic 
approach would have been to abolish death penalty entirely in the country. Given the recent 
development under international law, it would have been better if the Zimbabwean government had 
embraced the abolitionist approach of eradicating the death penalty rather than making exceptions 
for women, without extending same to men. 
 
5 .  Conclusion  
The adoption of the 2013 Constitution of Zimbabwe marks a milestone in advancing human 
rights in general and gender equality in particular. However, this article has shown that the 
selective prohibition of the death penalty under section 48 (2) (d) of the Constitution is 
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Press, 2010) 12. 




inconsistent with Zimbabwe’s obligations under international and national law to ensure gender 
equality. While the intention of the drafters of the Constitution may seem genuine, the 
application of this provision will lead to unfair discrimination against male offenders convicted 
of capital offences. Rather than the selective prohibition of death penalty, the better approach for 
the country would be an outright abolition of death sentence in the country. This will be 
consistent with recent moves within the international community to abolish the death penalty. 
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